Jinnah vs. Gandhi

The Brother Enemy

Despite their many differences, there’s a curious ricochet of similarities between Mohammad Ali Jinnahbhai Khojani and Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, the fathers of two nations that were created after decades of protracted struggle, first against a colonial power and then against each other. The roots of both men’s fairly-affluent families trace back to the Gujarati trading community of Kathiawar. Neither showed any exceptional academic brilliance, but both received an expensive British education and became lawyers. Both started their political career as members of the Congress; found their mentor in the moderate, nationalist Congress leader Gopal Krishna Gokhale, whose liberal ideology both chose to forget. Roderick Matthews, an amateur British historian has tried to analyse these two personalities in his book Jinnah vs. Gandhi, but ultimately, the book is more a compendium of events and offers limited insight. When in January 1915, the Gujarati Society of Bombay arranged a reception in Gandhi’s honour, one Mr MA Jinnah, Bar-at-Law, presided over the function. The difference that would ultimately irreparably damage the relationship was glimpsed in that maiden encounter: Jinnah welcomed Gandhi in fluent English and Gandhi responded in chaste Gujarati. The decisive breakpoint in Jinnah and Gandhi’s friendship came in December 1920, at the Nagpur session of the Congress, when khadi loincloth clashed against the three-piece Savile Row suit. Gandhi propounded his now famous non-cooperation strategy and ultimately Jinnah, outnumbered by Gandhi’s supporters, left the session in a huff. It is a moot point whether Gandhi could have been more generous towards Jinnah, but forgiving his rival was not in the Mahatma’s DNA. Look at what happened with Subhas Chandra Bose. Jinnah returned to London and in 1936, he re-entered subcontinental politics when he was invited to revitalise the Muslim League. Back in India, he launched into a game of political chess. The change was so profound that Gandhi lamented in 1938, “I miss the old nationalist. Are you still the same Mr. Jinnah?” It’s obvious Matthews has a sneaking admiration for Jinnah. He forgets to mention Gandhi’s counterpoints against the Pakistan proposal or how he demolished Jinnah’s two-nation theory. Similarly, that Jinnah’s spectacular rise was possible because at least two Viceroys were rabidly anti-Gandhi and gave Jinnah unfair advantages is ignored. Curiously, the author neglected to note Jinnah’s biggest triumph — he was able to depict Gandhi as a Hindu leader and rob him of the Muslim constituency he had judiciously built up. Also, Matthews should have been more careful with facts. He refers to one Pandit Sen and describes him as a Bengali Brahmin. Sens, while Bengali, are not classified as Brahmins. Another mistake is Matthews’s claim that Subhas Chandra Bose was nearly arrested in the middle of 1941 for offering an individual satyagraha. Bose disappeared in January 1941 (from his home where he was interned) and was never seen in this country again. Even after six and a half decades, Jinnah and Gandhi continue to fascinate readers, perhaps because their public postures left a bigger impact than their private feelings. So, a rigidly orthodox Hindu Gandhi, whom Jinnah often mocked as the dictator of the Congress, could fashion an open and argumentative India. On the other hand, Jinnah, for all his anglicised liberalism, fathered a country whose reputation for being intolerant and dictatorial has only strengthened over the decades. No wonder we can’t get enough of these two men.